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The Wisconsin Supreme Court has recently stated that it
will not be bound by the minimum federal constitutional stan-
dards enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in
construing the state constitution.
[I]t is the prerogative of the State of Wisconsin to afford
greater protection to the liberties of persons within its bound-
aries under the Wisconsin Constitution than is mandated by
the United States Supreme Court under the Fourteenth
Amendment.'
An understanding of the basic principles of construction of
the Wisconsin Constitution as developed by the state supreme
court is necessary to an independent interpretation of the Wis-
consin Declaration of Rights beyond the minimum federal
guarantees. The Declaration of Rights has been largely neg-
lected by the state courts since the application of the federal
Bill of Rights to state action through the fourteenth amend-
ment. Fortunately, a large body of Wisconsin constitutional
law was developed during the period when the state, rather
than the federal, constitution was the primary source of protec-
tion of individual rights. Additional light is shed on the state
constitution by the numerous decisions discussing principles of
construction in cases dealing with provisions of the Wisconsin
* B.A., Northern Michigan University, 1970; J.D., Marquette University, 1975;
member of the firm of Walther & Hailing, S.C., Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
1. State v. Doe, 78 Wis. 2d 161, 171, 254 N.W.2d 210, 215 (1977). The court cites
as examples Carpenter v. Dane County, 9 Wis. 249 (*274) (1859), requiring county-
appointed counsel for felony defendants 104 years prior to Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963), and Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 193 N.W. 89 (1923), applying the
exclusionary rule 38 years prior to Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
It is well established that "a State is free as a matter of its own law to impose
greater restrictions on police activity than those [The United States Supreme Court]
holds to be necessary under federal constitutional standards." Oregon v. Hass, 420
U.S. 714, 719 (1975). Decisions based on independent state grounds cannot be reviewed
by the United States Supreme Court. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125 (1945).
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Constitution which have no counterpart in the Federal Consti-
tution.
It was originally supposed that the state rather than federal
constitution would be the primary source for the protection of
individual rights. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in the fa-
mous pre-Civil War Fugitive Slave Act cases, stated:
A mere glance at the history of the times, at the debates in
the national convention that framed, and of the respective
state conventions which adopted the constitution, will suffice
to convince us that the respective states were regarded as the
essential, if not the sole guardians of the personal rights and
liberties of the individual citizens.2
Prior to the enactment of the fourteenth amendment in 1868,
the only restrictions on state action were those imposed by
state constitutions. 3 The Declaration of Rights of the Wisconsin
Constitution, independently construed by the Wisconsin court,
limited state action during this period.
2. In re Sherman M. Booth, 3 Wis. 13, 87 [*1, *881 (1854) (Smith, J., concurring
opinion).
The notion that the state governments would be more solicitous of individual rights
was not received without .skepticism. Story commented as follows in 1833:
It was long ago remarked that in a contest for power, "the body of the people
will always be on the side of the State governments. This will not only result
from their love of liberty and regard to their own safety, but from the strong
principles of human nature. The State governments operate upon those familiar
personal concerns to which the sensibility of individuals is awake. The distribu-
tion of private justice in a great measure belongs to them, they must always
appear to the sense of the people as the immediate guardians of their rights.
They will of course have the strongest hold on their attachment, respect, and
obedience." [Quote from Alexander Hamilton's speech of 1786] To which it
may be added, that the State governments must naturally open an easier field
for the operation of domestic ambition, of local interest, of personal popularity,
and of flattering influence to those who have no eager desire for a widespread
fame, or no acquirements to justify it.
J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONsTrrurION OF THE UNITED STATES 210-11 (5th ed.
1891) [hereinafter cited as STORY].
3. Justice Brennan writes:
Prior to the adoption of the federal Constitution, each of the rights eventually
recognized in the federal Bill of Rights had previously been protected in one or
more state constitutions. And prior to the adoption of the fourteenth amend-
ment, these state bills of rights, independently interpreted, were the primary
restraints on state action since the federal Bill of Rights bad been held inappli-
cable.
Brennan, State Constitutions and The Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HAav. L.
Rav. 489, 501-02 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Brennan].
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It is thus apparent that long before the enactment of the
fourteenth amendment, as well as since that time, our legisla-
ture was bound to accord to all persons within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws, and to refrain from legisla-
tion which deprived any of them of life, liberty, or the pursuit
of happiness.'
The state constitution, construed by the state courts, con-
tinued to be the primary source for the protection of the rights
of the people of Wisconsin during the slow process of absorption
of the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights into the four-
teenth amendment. It was not until 1925 that the United
States Supreme Court applied any of the first amendment
guarantees to state action. 5 Meanwhile, in 1890, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court held that Bible reading in public schools vio-
lated the state constitution.6 Early Wisconsin decisions at-
tempting to ascertain the state constitution's limits on the po-
lice power now provide a helpful guide to the construction of
the fundamental provisions of the Declaration of Rights.7
The Warren Court's extension of the specific guarantees of
the first eight amendments to state action8 resulted in the vir-
tual abandonment of any principled discussion of the state
counterpart provisions by the Wisconsin courts.' The state
4. State ex rel. Kellogg v. Currens, 111 Wis. 431, 435, 87 N.W. 561, 562 (1901).
5. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
6. State ex rel. Weiss v. District Bd. of School Dist. No. 8, 76 Wis. 177, 44 N.W.
967 (1890). Cf. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (holding such
practice to be violative of the first amendment). The specific holding in Weiss was
based both on the prohibition against "sectarian education" of art. X, sec. 3, and on
sec. 18 of the Declaration of Rights, which provides:
The right of every man to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of
his own conscience shall never be infringed; nor shall any man be compelled to
attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry,
against his consent; nor shall any control of, or interference with, the rights of
conscience be permitted, or any preference be given by law to any religious
establishments or modes of worship; nor shall any money be drawn from the
treasury for the benefit of religious societies, or religious or theological seminar-
ies.
7. See, e.g., Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 133 N.W. 209 (1911); Nunnemacher
v. State, 129 Wis. 190, 108 N.W. 627 (1906); and State ex rel. Zillmer v. Kreutzberg,
114 Wis. 530, 90 N.W. 1098 (1902).
8. See Brennan, supra note 3, at 493-94 for an outline of the United States Supreme
Court's extension of the specific guarantees to state action.
9. "During the activist Warren years, it was very easy for state courts, especially
in criminal cases, to fall into the drowsy habit of looking no further than federal
constitutional law." Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the
Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REv. 873, 878 (1976).
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counterpart provisions either were not discussed or were dis-
posed of with the observation that they are "substantially
equivalent" to the federal provisions. ' " A few decisions recog-
nized in theory the independent vitality of the clauses of the
Wisconsin Declaration of Rights.1 It is only within the past few
years that the Wisconsin Supreme Court has indicated a will-
ingness to return to an independent interpretation of the guar-
antees of the state constitution.'2
This article is devoted to an examination of principles of
construction of the Wisconsin Constitution as already devel-
oped by the Wisconsin Supreme Court., These principles pro-
vide a firm basis for an interpretation of the basic guarantees
of the state constitution beyond the minimal federal standards.
10. See, e.g., Haase v. Sawicki, 20 Wis. 2d 308, 311 n.2, 121 N.W.2d 876, 878 n.2
(1963):
It is well settled by Wisconsin case law that the various freedoms preserved by
sec. 1, art. I, Wis. Const., are substantially equivalent of the due process and
equal-protection-of-the-laws clauses of the Fourteenth amendment to the
United States constitution.
See also Milwaukee v. Horvath, 31 Wis. 2d 490, 495-96, 143 N.W.2d 446, 449 (1966):
This court has not been called upon to interpret the meaning of "involuntary
servitude" in sec. 2, art. I, of the Wisconsin constitution. However, since both
federal and Wisconsin provisions were patterned after the Northwest Ordinance
of 1787, the decisions of the United States supreme court interpreting the Thir-
teenth amendment should also apply with equal force and effect to sec. 2, art.
I. And this should be the case despite the fact that sec. 2, art. I, appeared in
the original Wisconsin constitution of 1848, while the Thirteenth amendment
was not adopted until after the Civil War.
11. See McCauley v. Tropic of Cancer, 20 Wis. 2d 134, 139, 121 N.W.2d 545, 548
(1963):
We observe . . . that a state may permit greater freedom of speech and press
than the Fourteenth amendment would require, although it may not permit less.
We recognize Roth [Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)] and other
decisions of the supreme court of the United States as completely binding upon
us in determining whether the state violates the Fourteenth amendment in
proscribing or suppressing a particular piece of material as obscene. Such deci-
sions are eminent and highly persuasive, but not controlling, authority, on the
meaning of the term "obscene" in our own statutes, and on the question of
whether the proscription or suppression of a particular piece of material as
obscene violates sec. 3, art. I of our state constitution.
12. See, e.g., Justice Abrahamson's concurring opinions in Terry v. Percy, 84 Wis.
2d 693, 697-700, 267 N.W.2d 380, 382-83 (1978), on remand from the United States
Supreme Court, 434 U.S. 808 (1977), vacating Terry v. Schubert, 74 Wis. 2d 487, 247
N.W.2d 109 (1976); Laasch v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 587, 597-99, 267 N.W.2d 278, 284-85
(1978); and State v. Starke, 81 Wis. 2d 399, 420-23, 260 N.W.2d 739, 749-52 (1978).
See also State v. Doe, 78 Wis. 2d 161, 254 N.W.2d 210 (1977); State v. Taylor, 60 Wis.
2d 506, 522-23, 210 N.W.2d 873, 882 (1973).
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II. INTENT OF THE FRAMERS
Story stated "The first and fundamental rule in the inter-
pretation of all instruments is, to construe them according to
the sense of the terms and the intention of the parties."' 3 Deci-
sions of the Wisconsin Supreme Court are to the same effect. 4
The intent to be discerned is that of the people who adopted
the state constitution. 5 "While this principle of construction is
easily stated, its application is perilously difficult.' ' 16
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court has paid lip service
to the "plain meaning" rule, it has, at least in practice, recog-
nized the necessity of going beyond the bare words of the con-
stitutional provision at issue. 7 The court has properly recog-
nized that the text of the provision, read in the context of the
whole constitution, is the starting point in ascertaining its
meaning. But it also has been willing to consider any relevant
evidence of the true meaning of the clause at issue.5
Thus, the antecedent and contemporary historical setting
may be instructive. 9 The debates and proceedings of the con-
stitutional conventions of 1846 and 1848 are properly to be
considered."0 With important limitations, the early practical
construction of the constitution by the various departments of
government may be of value.2 ' Finally, the constitution is to be
interpreted according to the broader purposes of the preamble
and Declaration of Rights. 22
13. STORY, supra note 2, at 305.
14. See, e.g., State ex rel. Zimmerman v. Dammann, 201 Wis. 84, 88-89, 228 N.W.
593, 595 (1930):
The familiar and elementary rule that it is the duty of the court to discover
and give effect to the intent of the legislature in construing a statute is equally
applicable to the constitution, and the intent and purpose of the framers of the
constitution should therefore be a guide to its application and interpretation.
15. See text accompanying notes 23-27 infra.
16. Antieau, Constitutional Construction: A Guide to the Principles and Their
Application, 51 NOTRE DAME LAw. 358, 358 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Antieauj.
17. See text accompanying notes 28-53 infra.
18. See text accompanying notes 53-86 infra.
19. See text accompanying notes 77-95 infra.
20. See text accompanying notes 89-106 infra.
21. See text accompanying notes 96-119 infra.
22. See text accompanying notes 120-46 infra.
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III. THE INTENT TO BE ASCERTAINED
Is THAT OF THE PEOPLE
In a 1925 decision the state supreme court said:
Perfection is an attribute solely of the Supreme Ruler of the
universe; and because of the tendency for human beings to
err, the necessity for construction has arisen and exists, and
such construction is designed chiefly to ascertain the inten-
tion, in order that the voice of the people may receive proper
recognition and that it may not be thwarted.'
The preamble to the constitution itself declares, "We, the
people of Wisconsin, . . . do establish this constitution." 24 And
Cooley has said that "the object of construction, as applied to
a written constitution, is to give effect to the intent of the
people adopting it.
'i
The Wisconsin decisions are in accord. In an 1849 case,
State ex rel. Dunning v. Giles, 21 the court was faced with the
construction of article XIV, section 2, providing for the contin-
uance of territorial laws which are not "repugnant to this con-
stitution." Matts was elected sheriff under a territorial statute
limiting the office to one term. He received the highest number
of votes in an election for the same office in the first election
under the 1848 constitution. The losing party contended that
the territorial statute was in force by virtue of article XIV,
section 2, and that Matt's purported election was a nullity. The
supreme court in an opinion written by Chief Justice Stow,
held that the territorial statute was repugnant to the constitu-
tion.
On its face [the constitution] purports to be and in fact was,
the work of the people-of the whole people-in which all had
an equal and common interest and right, and to which all
owed a common duty and allegiance; and I cannot believe
23. State ex rel. Ekern v. Zimmerman, 187 Wis. 180, 196, 204 N.W. 803, 809 (1925).
Cooley points out that construction of state constitutions is necessary, not only because
of the "deficiencies of human language," but also because constitutional provisions
must be applied "not only to the subjects directly within the contemplation of those
who framed them, but also to a great variety of new circumstances which could not
have been anticipated, but which must nevertheless be governed by the general rules
which the instruments establish." T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 97 (8th ed.
1927), [hereinafter cited as COOLEY].
24. WIS. CONST., Preamble.
25. COOLEY, supra note 23, at 124 (emphasis in original).
26. 2 Pin. 166, 1 Chand. 112 (1849).
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that a constitution thus broad and catholic ever meant, by
adopting an old provincial law, to extend the political disabil-
ities of certain inhabitants of the territory to the citizens of
the State.Y
In the 1890 Bible-reading decision, the court responded to
a school board's argument that exclusion of Bible reading from
public schools detracted from the values of the Bible and reli-
gion, by stating that the proper place for such teachings is in
the churches and homes.
The constitution does not interfere with such teaching and
culture. It only banishes theological polemics from the dis-
trict schools. It does this, not because of any hostility to reli-
gion, but because the people who adopted it believed that the
public good would thereby be promoted, and they so declared
in the preamble.2 8
IV. THE PLAIN MEANING MAXIM
Where the words are plain and clear, and the sense dis-
tinct and perfect arising on them, there is generally no ne-
cessity to have recourse to other means of interpretation. It
is only where there is some ambiguity or doubt arising from
other sources that interpretation has its proper office.
Chief Justice Dixon, speaking for the Wisconsin court in
1872, stated:
The office of interpretation is to bring out the sense where the
words used are in some manner doubtful, and where these are
plain and unambiguous the court cannot depart from the
language of the statute. . . . It is only where the intention of
the legislature is ambiguously expressed, so as to be fairly
capable of two or more meanings, that interpretation or any
latitude of construction is allowable.30
The classic statement of the plain meaning maxim contains
several important limitations and exceptions. Initially, the
meaning of the words must truly be "plain." Wisconsin's Jus-
tice Marshall, after restating the plain meaning rule added:
27. Id. at 169-70 (emphasis in original).
28. State ex reL. Weiss v. District Bd. of School Dist. No. 8, 76 Wis. 177, 202, 44
N.W. 967, 976 (1890).
29. STORY, supra note 2, at 306.
30. Mundt v. Sheboygan & F. du L. R.R. Co., 31 Wis. 451, 457 (1872).
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The language of the law is not necessarily free from ambi-
guity merely because looking thereto alone no uncertainty of
meaning appears. Ambiguity, as has often been said, may as
well spring from the effect that would result by applying a
law in its literal sense, as from obscurity of expression in the
words themselves ...
One of the familiar principles to be applied in determining
whether words of a law which are plain on their face are
ambiguous nevertheless, is that it must always be presumed
that the lawmakers did not intend anything clearly unreason-
able or absurd.3'
Because a constitution, unlike a statute, is primarily a dec-
laration of general principles intended to endure, it is difficult
to perceive of a truly plain and unambiguous constitutional
provision.32
Within the classic formulation of the plain meaning rule,
uncertainty of meaning may arise, due to conflicts with other
clauses in the same instrument, or from incongruities between
the words and the apparent intention of the whole instrument
or its avowed object.33
In order to effectuate the purpose intended by the people,
the Wisconsin court has often gone beyond the plain literal
meaning of the constitution. In State ex rel. Martin v. Heil,3
the court construed article V, section 7, which provides "In case
of the impeachment of the governor, . . . or his . . . death
• . ., the powers and duties of the office shall devolve upon the
lieutenant governor for the residue of the term . . .," to allow
for the succession of the lieutenant governor where the
governor-elect died before taking office. The court, by Justice
Wickhem, said:
It is extremely important in the interpretation of constitu-
tional provisions that we avoid determinations based purely
on technical or verbal argument and that we seek to discover
the true spirit and intent of the provisions examined. We
must not fail to give effect to plain and completely unambi-
31. State ex rel. Williams v. Samuelson, 131 Wis. 499, 504-05, 111 N.W. 712, 714
(1907).
32. See State ex rel. Postel v. Marcus, 160 Wis. 354, 152 N.W. 419, rev'd on
rehearing, 160 Wis. 380, 152 N.W. 428 (1915).
33. STORY, supra note 2, at 306.
34. 242 Wis. 41, 7 N.W.2d 375 (1941).
[Vol. 62:531
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guous language in the constitution, but where there is a rea-
sonable ground to differ concerning the sense in which lan-
guage is used, the provision should be examined in its setting
in order to find out, if possible, the real meaning and substan-
tial purpose of those who adopted it."5
The court went on to consider the proceedings of the constitu-
tional convention and the early practical construction of the
legislature and concluded that a reasonable construction of the
section provided for succession as well as the reasons for the
creation of the office of lieutenant governor.
To the extent that it purports to exclude consideration of
extrinsic aids in the construction of state constitutional provi-
sions, the plain meaning rule probably has been rejected in
Wisconsin. Two recent education cases are illustrative. In the
1974 case, Board of Education v. Sinclair, " the state supreme
court held that public schools could charge pupils for book
rentals without violating the provision of article X, section 3:
"[District] schools shall be free and without charge for tuition
to all children. . . ." The language of the text of the provision
received brief discussion, with the court's decision being based
primarily upon the practices prevailing in 1848 and the early
practical construction by the legislature.
Two years later, in Buse v. Smith,3 involving recently en-
acted negative-aid provisions for school district financing,3 the
court stated:
In its interpretation of constitutional provisions this court
is committed to the method of analysis utilized in Board of
Education v. Sinclair, supra. The court will view:
(1) The plain meaning of the words in the context used;
(2) The historical analysis of the constitutional debates
and of what practices were in existence in 1848, which the
court may reasonably presume were also known to the fra-
mers of the 1848 constitution. . .; and
35. Id. at 55 (emphasis added).
36. 65 Wis. 2d 179, 222 N.W.2d 143 (1974).
37. 74 Wis. 2d 550, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976).
38. Wis. STATS. §§ 121.07-.08 (1973) provided that negative-aid districts were re-
quired to pay a portion of revenues raised by local tax levies into the state fund to be
commingled with state revenues and disbursed as state aids to positive-aid districts.
The court in Buse held that the statutes violated art. VIII, sec. 1: "The rule of
taxation shall be uniform . . -"
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(3) The earliest interpretation of this section by the legis-
lature as manifested in the first law passed following the
adoption of the constitution.3 9
This is consistent with Wisconsin Justice Doerfler's state-
ment in 1925 that "where a doubt is raised either from the
language employed or from the history of the enactment, or
from the object and purpose it is designed to achieve, these
elements may be taken into consideration in order to establish
the intention. '40
But the language of the constitution is to be the primary
source in ascertaining meaning. In the 1855 case of Attorney
General ex rel. Bashford v. Barstow, 4' the court held that it had
the power under the state constitution to oust the incumbent
governor in a quo warranto proceeding, despite indications
from the incumbent governor that, as head of the executive
department, he would not honor the court's mandate.2 Chief
Justice Whiton responded as follows to the governor's reliance
upon proceedings of the federal constitutional convention and
the ratifying state conventions and the writings of political
essayists:
39. Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 568, 247 N.W.2d 141, 149 (1976) (citations
omitted).
40. State ex rel. Ekern v. Zimmerman, 187 Wis. 180, 192, 204 N.W. 803, 808 (1925).
41. 4 Wis. 567 [*567] (1855).
42. Matthew Carpenter, Governor Barstow's attorney, argued:
As it cannot for a moment be conceded that in a conflict of power between
the judicial and executive departments of the government, the judiciary has the
sole right to judge the contest, or any better or further right than the executive,
to judge of the relative powers of the two departments, the governor will, in
reviewing the whole subject, carefully examine the decision of this court, giving
to the opinions of the judges, in the language of President Jackson, "only such
influence as the force of their reasoning may deserve." He will then be obliged
to determine for the executive branch of the government, 1st, whether this court
can exercise original jurisdiction over any suit commenced by an information
in the nature of quo warranto; and 2d, if so, whether this writ can, in any case,
be directed to the executive of the state.
If he should, when assisted by the reasoning of the judges, come to the same
conclusion, he may send us here to your honors' bar again. Should he, however,
be so unfortunate as to be compelled to an opposite determination, he would
be bound by his official oath of fidelity to the constitution, to regard the pro-
ceedings of this court as unwarranted by the constitution, and a gross usurpation
of power; and to treat any judgment this court may presume to render therein
as an absolute nullity.
Id. at 629 [*620-21].
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But it must be apparent, that, as the sovereign people of
this state have adopted a written constitution, in which the
powers of the government are distributed among the depart-
ments established, and which is the supreme law of the land,
we must look to that instrument for the purpose of determin-
ing this question.43
Justice Smith stated:
Let us then look to that constitution, adopted by the peo-
ple of Wisconsin, and endeavor to ascertain its true intent
and meaning, the distribution of the powers of government
which it has in fact made. . .. We made it ourselves. We
are bound to abide by it, until altered, amended or annulled,
and we must construe it, and support it, not according to the
vague, conjectural hypothesis of volunteer expounders, resi-
dent in other states, having no care or interest in the govern-
ment, and having no knowledge of the constitution of our
state, but according to its plain letter and meaning ....
The people then made this constitution, and adopted it as
their primary law. The people of other states made for them-
selves respectively, constitutions which are construed by
their own appropriate functionaries. Let them construe
theirs-let us construe, and stand by ours."
In 1881 Justice Cassoday, in response to the parties' discus-
sion of the "grave consequences" of sustaining or voiding an act
under the uniformity of taxation clause of article VIII, section
1, stated:
The real question. . .is: What words are employed? What
command to they utter?. . . [I]t is the plain duty of the
court to find out, if possible, the extent of the inhibition upon
the legislature in prescribing the property which shall be sub-
ject to taxation, and then, in the light of the authorities,
proclaim it.45
V. THE SENSE IN WINCH WORDS ARE USED
Words or terms used in a constitution, being dependent
on ratification by the people, must be understood in the sense
43. Id. at 671 [*657].
44. Id. at 785 [*757-581 (emphasis in original).
45. Wisconsin Cent. R.R. v. Taylor County, 52 Wis. 36, 58, 8 N.W. 833, 837 (1881).
See also Bond v. French, 2 Pin. 181, 184, 1 Chand. 130, - (Wis. 1849), per Stow,
C.J.: "In deciding this question, our only guide is the constitution, in construing which




most obvious to the common understanding at the time of its
adoption, although a different rule might be applied in inter-
preting statutes and acts of the legislature. . . . [I]t is pre-
sumed that words appearing in a constitution have been used
according to their plain, natural, and usual signification and
import, and the courts are not at liberty to disregard the plain
meaning of words of a constitution in order to search for some
other conjectured intent. 8
The case involved the construction of article VIE, section
8, requiring a record "yea and nay" vote for any act which
"makes. . .an appropriation of public or trust money" in the
public treasury. A 1923 worker's compensation statute required
the employer to pay death benefits into the state treasury when
a covered worker died with no dependents. The bill was passed
without a record vote. The court conceded that the monies
appropriated were "trust money" in a technical sense but
stated that the real inquiry was into the obvious understanding
of those who voted on the provision.47 The court held that the
appropriation did not involve "trust money."
Regarding the rule that words used in a constitution are
construed in their common sense, Story stated:
Constitutions are not designed for metaphysical or logical
subtleties, for niceties of expression, for critical propriety, for
elaborate shades of meaning, or for the exercise of philosophi-
cal acuteness or judicial research. They are instruments of a
practical nature, founded on the common business of human
life, adapted to common wants, designed for common use,
and fitted for common understandings. The people make
them, the people adopt them, the people must be supposed
to read them, with the help of common-sense, and cannot be
presumed to admit in them any recondite meaning or any
extraordinary gloss. 8
46. B.F. Sturtevant Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 186 Wis. 10, 19, 202 N.W. 324, 327
(1925).
47. Id.
48. STORY, supra note 2, at 345.
In a similar vein, Cooley states:
Narrow and technical reasoning is misplaced when it is brought to bear upon
an instrument framed by the people themselves, for themselves, and designed
as a chart upon which every man, learned and unlearned, may be able to trace
the leading principles of government (footnote omitted).
COOLEY, supra note 23, at 131-32.
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The common sense in which the words are employed in a
constitution adopted by the people may not be distorted by an
arbitrary application of maxims of construction "which savor
rather of the closet than of practical life." 49 Thus, in
Nunnemacher v. State,5 the Wisconsin court rejected arbitrary
application of the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius
with the observation that:
[T]his rule, like all other mere rules of construction applied
to ambiguous words, yields to proof of surrounding facts and
circumstances which satisfactorily demonstrates that the
meaning intended by the parties was different."
Similarly, in a 1930 decision, Chief Justice Rosenberry, for
the court, rejected an interpretation of the word "officer" as
having the same meaning in the various provisions of the con-
stitution in which it appears, stating:
It is considered that a question of such a weighty and far-
reaching character as that under consideration here ought not
to be- determined by the consideration of small and compara-
tively inconsequential matters.52
However, where technical words are used, having a meaning
established at common law when the provision was adopted,
the technical meaning is properly applied . 3 The principle is
well illustrated in a 1925 decision, State ex rel. Allis v.
Wiesner,54 involving the construction of article XI, section 2,
which then provided "No municipal corporation shall take pri-
vate property for public use, against the consent of the owner,
without the necessity thereof being first established by the ver-
49. COOLEY, supra note 23, at 171:
It will be perceived that we have not thought it important to quote and to dwell
upon those arbitrary rules to which so much attention is sometimes given, and
which savor rather of the closet than of practical life. Our observation would
lead us to the conclusion that they are more often resorted to as aids in ingenious
attempts to make the constitution seem to say what it does not, than with a view
to make that instrument express its real intent.
50. 129 Wis. 190, 108 N.W. 627 (1906).
51. Id. at 214, 108 N.W. at 634.
52. State ex rel. Zimmerman v. Dammann, 201 Wis. 84, 95, 228 N.W. 593, 597
(1930). See also STORY, supra note 2, -at 346-47.
53. STORY, supra note 2, at 346. But where a word has both a common and a
technical sense, "the latter is to be preferred, unless some attendant circumstance
points clearly to the former."
54. 187 Wis. 384, 204 N.W. 589 (1925).
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dict of a jury." 55 At issue was a 1914 Milwaukee Charter provi-
sion providing for a "jury" in eminent domain proceedings
which did not act under the direction of a court. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court concluded that this was not a "jury" within the
meaning of the constitution by reference to common law. Chief
Justice Rosenberry stated "where technical terms were in use
prior to the adoption of the Constitution, such terms were used
in the Constitution in the sense in which they were understood
at common law.""6 The court emphatically rejected the conten-
tion that "it is a historical fact that the word 'jury' was care-
lessly used around the time of the adoption of the Constitution
in 1848 . . . ."I Instead it stated:
Having in mind the state of the law at the time of the adop-
tion of the Constitution, it is not conceivable that the framers
of that document intended to use the term "jury" other than
as applicable to a body of 12 men charged with a duty of
finding certain facts under the direction of a court. Had the
framers of the Constitution intended to provide for a jury of
inquest, one quite as well known at the common law as a petit
jury, they would have used that term. 8
In In re Cannon" the Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to
recognize an act of the legislature reinstating to practice an
attorney suspended by the court. Article VII, section 2, merely
provides that the judicial power is vested in the courts, without
defining the term "court." The supreme court reviewed English
common law at length, and concluded:
So when the term "court" is used in the constitution it is
plain that the framers had in mind that governmental insti-
tution known to the common law possessing powers charac-
terizing it as a court and distinguishing it from all other insti-
tutions."
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has frequently resorted to
technical pre-existing common-law definitions in its construc-
tion of the constitutional provisions that, in civil cases, "the
55. By 1961 amendment "by the verdict of a jury" was replaced with "in the
manner prescribed by the legislature."
56. State ex rel. Allis v. Wiesner, 187 Wis. 384, 394, 204 N.W. 589, 593 (1925).
57. Id.
58. 187 Wis. at 396, 204 N.W. at 594.
59. 206 Wis. 374, 240 N.W. 441 (1932).
60. Id. at 393, 240 N.W. at 449.
[Vol. 62:531
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION
right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate"6' and that "writs
of error shall never be prohibited. '6 2 This seems particularly
appropriate since the provisions, by their terms, must relate to
the law as it existed at the time of the adoption of the constitu-
tion.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has, however, recognized
that, in construing the Wisconsin Constitution, it will not be
bound by common-law practices which do not conform to our
present concepts of individual rights. The proposition was well
stated by Justice Owen in 1922:
In all matters touching the affairs of government and the
liberty of the citizen we are apt to go astray if we proceed
upon the assumption that as to such matters we are governed
by the principles of the common law, for the reason that our
fundamental notions of the rights of the individual, of the
liberty of the citizen, and of the repository of sovereign power
do not conform to the spirit in which the principles of the
common law were generated and developed.63
VI. EXAMINATION OF THE WHOLE INSTRUMENT
It is elementary that, in the construction of constitutions
"the whole is to be examined with a view to arriving at the true
intention of each part . . . ."" State ex rel. Reynolds v. Zim-
merman,6 5 is instructive. In 1963 the legislature by joint reso-
lution, without the concurrence of the governor, provided for
the apportionment of Wisconsin legislative districts. Article V,
section 10, requires that before a bill becomes law it shall be
presented to the governor. The provision relating to appor-
tionment of federal congressional districts6 requires that such
apportionment be "provided by law," while the provision deal-
ing with apportionment of Wisconsin legislative districts" con-
61. See Norval v. Rice, 2 Wis. 17, 22 [*22, *291 (1853).
62: See Aetna Accident & Liab. Co. v. Lyman, 155 Wis. 135, 137, 144 N.W. 278,
279 (1913).
63. State ex rel. Rodd v. Verage, 177 Wis. 295, 322, 187 N.W. 830, 841 (1922).
64. COOLEY, supra note 23, at 127. See also Student Ass'n, Univ. of Wis.-Milw. v.
Baum, 74 Wis. 2d 283, 294-95, 246 N.W.2d 622, 627 (1976), involving statutory con-
struction:
[T]he cardinal rule in interpreting statutes is that the purpose of the whole act
is to be sbught and is favored over a construction which will defeat the manifest
object of the act.
65. 22 Wis. 2d 544, 126 N.W.2d 551 (1964).
66. WIs. CONsT. art. XIV, § 10.
67. WIs. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
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tains no such "by law" language, merely providing that "the
legislature shall apportion." The respondent made a cogent
argument, based upon the text of the provision, that the ex-
press inclusion of the words "by law" in the congressional ap-
portionment clause and their absence from the state legislative
apportionment clause indicated the intent of the framers of the
constitution to allow the legislature to apportion the state legis-
lature either by law with the concurrence of the government or,
as was done here, by joint resolution." In rejecting this conten-
tion, the court examined the various provisions of the constitu-
tion providing for important legislative functions and stated
that:
[We must construe sec. 3, art. IV in the most reasonable
manner in relation to the fundamental purpose of the consti-
tution as a whole, to wit: To create and define the institutions
whereby a representative democratic form of government
may effectively function. 9
In support of the court's conclusion that Bible reading in
public schools is violative of the state constitution, Justice
Orton, in a separate opinion, referred to numerous provisions
of the state constitution dealing generally with religion and
education and stated:
These provisions of the constitution are cited together to
show how completely this state, as a civil government, and
all its civil institutions, are divorced from all possible connec-
tion or alliance with any and all religions, religious worship,
religious establishments, or modes of worship, and with
everything of a religious character or appertaining to reli-
gion . . .70
Since it must be assumed that the people have expressed them-
selves carefully in written constitutions, every clause and word
of the constitution must be construed so as to have force and
meaning."
Article VI, section 4, provides for the election of certain
68. 22 Wis. 2d at 554, 126 N.W.2d at 557.
69. Id. at 555, 126 N.W.2d at 558 (emphasis added).
70. State ex rel. Weiss v. District Bd. of School Dist. No. 8, 76 Wis. 177, 217-18,
44 N.W. 967, 981 (1890).
71. State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 440, 515, 51 N.W. 724, 740
(1892) (Pinney, J., concurring). See also Rowan v. State, 30 Wis. 129, 145 (1872) and
CooLEY, supra note 23, at 129.
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county officers, including sheriffs, and for their removal from
office by the governor. The removal portion omits any reference
to "for cause" or similar language. In State ex rel. Rodd v.
Verage,12 the state court held that the governor could not re-
move a sheriff except "for cause."
The constitution provides that the officers referred to shall be
chosen by the qualified electors of the county. Having so
provided, it does not seem likely that a provision would be
inserted affording an opportunity for its complete nullifica-
tion. If the provision we are considering is to be construed as
conferring arbitrary power of removal upon the governor,
then it is apparent that the governor may remove county
officers who are distasteful to him from personal, political, or
other reasons and install officers of his own choosing to dis-
charge the official functions of these various county officers. 3
Because a state constitution, unlike the federal constitu-
tion, is designed to limit the powers of the departments of state
government,74 each of its provisions are presumed to be manda-
tory rather than merely directory.7 5 "The convention, in mak-
ing a constitution, had a higher duty to perform than to give
the legislature advice."7
VII. ANTECEDENT AND CONTEMPORARY HISTORY
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has consistently recognized
that, in the construction of a provision of the state constitution,
the intent of the framers cannot be discovered merely by look-
72. 177 Wis. 295, 187 N.W. 830 (1922).
73. Id. at 299-300, 187 N.W. at 832-33.
74. See, e.g., Wisconsin Cent. R.R. v. Taylor County, 52 Wis. 37, 59, 8 N.W. 833,
837 (1881):
Bearing in mind a rule of construing a state constitution, often asserted by this
and other courts, that such constitution is not, like the constitution of the
United States, a grant of power, but rather a limitation upon the powers of the
state legislature ....
75. COOLEY, supra note 23, at 159. See also State ex rel. Postel v. Marcus, 160 Wis.
354, 370-71, 152 N.W. 419, 425 (1915).
76. State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 440, 485, 51 N.W. 724, 730
(1892). In a separate opinion Justice Pinney stated:
It does not appear that the language used was employed by way of exhortation
to the legislature to eschew the pernicious methods of gerrymandering, then
recognized as an evil to be greatly deplored. It better suits the important charac-
ter of the rights sought to be guarded, and the character and purpose of the
instrument, to regard these provisions as mandatory and not directory merely.
Id. at 513-14, 54 N.W. at 739.
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ing at the words of the clause alone without ascertaining the
purpose of the whole instrument in view of the circumstances
which gave rise to the particular clause.77 The rule was well
stated by Justice Cassoday in State ex rel. Weiss v. District
Board of School District No. Eight, quoting with approval fed-
eral decisions:
It is undoubtedly true... that "in the construction of the
constitution we must look to the history of the times, and
examine the state of things existing when it was framed and
adopted, to ascertain the old law, the mischief, and the
remedy" . . . . "Perhaps the safest rule of interpretation,
after all, will be found to be to look to the nature and objects
of the particular powers, duties, and rights, with all the lights
and aids of contemporary history; and to give to the words of
each, just such operation and force, consistent with their le-
gitimate meaning, as may fairly secure and attain the ends
proposed. "I'
After a discussion of the need in 1848 to populate the state and
the increasing migration of diverse groups, many of whom were
fleeing from religious intolerance, 79 Justice Lyons stated:
77. State ex rel. Ekern v. Zimhmerman, 187 Wis. 180, 184, 204 N.W. 803, 805 (1925).
Wisconsin has apparently rejected Cooley's statement that extrinsic evidence of con-
temporary circumstances may only be resorted to in order to resolve ambiguity and
that an ambiguity cannot be created by resort to such a historical analysis. CooLY,
supra note 23, at 141.
78. 76 Wis. 177, 203, 44 N.W. 967, 976 (1890) (emphasis in original)(citations omit-
ted).
79. Id. at 197-98, 44 N.W. at 974. The actual language of the court, by Justice Lyon,
is worth considering in full:
It may not be uninstructive to consider somewhat certain other circumstances,
existing when the constitution was adopted, which may fairly be presumed to
have influenced the inserting therein of the provision against 'sectarian instruc-
tion' in the district schools. The early settlers of Wisconsin came chiefly from
New England and the Middle States. They represented the best religious, intel-
lectual, and moral culture, and the business enterprise and sagacity, of the
people of the states from whence they came. They found here a territory possess-
ing all the elements essential to the development of a great state. They were
intensely desirous that the future state should be settled and developed as
rapidly as possible. They chose from their number wise, sagacious, Christian
men, imbued with the sentiments common to all, to frame their constitution.
The convention assembled at a time when immigration had become very large
and was constantly increasing. The immigrants came from nearly all the coun-
tries of Europe, but most largely from Germany and Ireland. As a class, they
were industrious, intelligent, honest, and thrifty-just the material for the de-
velopment of a new state. Besides, they brought with them, collectively, much
wealth. They were also religious and sectarian. Among them were Catholics,
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Such were the circumstances surrounding the convention
which framed the constitution. In the light of them, and with
a lively appreciation by its members of the horrors of sectar-
ian intolerance and the priceless value of perfect religious and
sectarian freedom and equality, is it unreasonable to say that
sectarian instruction was thus excluded, to the end that the
child of the Jew, or Catholic, or Unitarian, or Universalist, or
Quaker should not be compelled to listen to the stated read-
ing of passages of scripture which are accepted by others as
giving the lie to the religious faith and belief of their parents
and themselves?"
In construing amendments to the state constitution, the
court has considered the actual questions submitted to the
voters"1 and the recitals in the published notices.12 A potentially
valuable means of ascertaining the purpose of provisions of the
state constitution could be by reference to contemporary news
accounts.3 The 1848 constitution, for the most part, closely
paralleled the one rejected in 1846.84 The proceedings of the
1846 convention were "systematically reported" by the news-
papers and "the people of the territory took a lively interest in
the course of the proceedings . . ."I' The provisions of the
Jews, and adherents of many Protestant sects. These immigrants were cordially
welcomed, and it is manifest the convention framed the constitution with refer-
ence to attracting them to Wisconsin. Many, perhaps most, of these immigrants
came from countries in which a state religion was maintained and enforced,
while some of them were nonconformists and had suffered under the disabilities
resulting from their rejection of the established religion. What more tempting
inducement to cast their lot with us could have been held out to them than the
assurance that, in addition to the guaranties of the right of conscience and of
worship in their own way, the free district schools in which their children were
to be, or might be, educated, were absolute common ground, where the pupils
were equal, and where sectarian instruction, and with it sectarian intolerance,
under which they had smarted in the old country, could never enter?
80. Id. at 198, 44 N.W. at 974-75.
81. State ex rel. Ekern v. Zimmerman, 187 Wis. 180, 183-84, 204 N.W. 803, 805
(1925).
82. State ex rel. Frederick v. Zimmerman, 254 Wis. 600, 607, 37 N.W.2d 473, 477
(1949).
83. See State ex rel. Thomson v. Giessel, 262 Wis. 51, 67-68, 53 N.W.2d 726, 733-
34 (1952), where Justice Currie, in dissent, refers to a news article circulated prior to
the 1846 ratification vote to ascertain "what evils did the framers seek to prevent by
the language employed."
84. Brown, The Making of the Wisconsin Constitution, 1949 Wis. L. Rxv. 648, 655
n. * [hereinafter cited as Brown].
85. Id. at 660.
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1846 constitution received extensive and detailed press cover-
age prior to the ratification vote.8"
An understanding of the conditions and concerns which
gave rise to the constitution is helpful, but, since the constitu-
tion deals with principles, its provisions must be construed in
the light of evolving conditions and values. "[A] principle to
be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief
which gave it birth."' Justice Barnes of the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court stated in 1910:
It is highly improbable that our constitution makers intended
that any such result would follow from a provision practically
taken from the English Bill of Rights, and which was framed
to meet grave abuses of a very different character. Such in-
tention would entirely ignore those altered conditions which
the mutations of time bring about, and would be tantamount
to an egotistical declaration that when the constitution was
framed the millenium had arrived and progress had reached
its ultimate goal."
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has frequently resorted to
the debates and proceedings of the 1846 and 1848 constitu-
tional conventions. 9 Justice Marshall stated for the court in
1915:
Commonly, the debates in constitutional conventions have
been referred to for the purpose of discovering the full mean-
ing intended to be embodied therein. . . .We must look to
the history of the subject as they had it before them and all
the circumstances characterizing their action, particularly as
appears upon the journal of the convention. In short, we must
strive by all means within our jurisdiction to put ourselves in
the place the constitution makers occupied,-look at the situ-
ation they had in view through the same vista they observed
it, and then read out of the term the meaning they sought to
embody in it."
86. Id. at 692-93.
87. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
88. State ex rel. Van Alstine v. Frear, 142 Wis. 320, 338-39, 125 N.W. 961, 968
(1910).
89. See, e.g., Martin v. Heil, 242 Wis. 41, 55-58, 7 N.W.2d 375, 381-82 (1942);
Estate of Payne, 208 Wis. 142, 145-46, 242 N.W. 553, 554-55 (1932); State ex rel. Zilisch
v. Auer, 197 Wis. 284, 289-90, 221 N.W. 860, 862 (1928); State ex rel. Owen v. Donald,
160 Wis. 21, 72, 151 N.W. 331, 347 (1915); Nunnemacher v. State, 129 Wis. 190, 206-
14, 108 N.W. 627, 631-34 (1906).
90. State ex reL. Owen v. Donald, 160 Wis. 21, 81, 151 N.W. 331, 350 (1915).
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The proceedings of the convention of 1846 are especially
helpful.
Although the constitution framed by this convention was
rejected by the people, extended discussion of its proceedings
is appropriate. In essential details the 1848 constitution fol-
lowed closely the rejected predecessor. Also the framing of the
1846 constitution brought more sharply into focus the vital
political, economic and social issues of the period than did its
successor. After the 1846 convention, that of 1848, in matter
of public interest, was largely an anti-climax.9'
Amid extensive newspaper discussion, the 1846 constitution
was defeated by the people by a vote of 20,333 in favor and
14,119 opposed to ratification. 2 The 1848 constitution, amid "a
mood almost of apathy," was approved by a vote of 16,417 to
6,184.93
The court has also considered earlier constitutional provi-
sions and proceedings from other states, particularly New
York, in construing the later-adopted sections of the Wisconsin
Constitution. Justice Cassoday stated for the court in 1881:
Our constitutional convention contained many able men, and
several able lawyers. In the important work of devising and
adopting a constitution, we must assume that they carefully
examined the constitutions of the several states . . .
However, even where the court has found that the Wisconsin
provision at issue was directly taken from that of New York, it
has rejected the construction of the New York courts. 5
VIH. PRACTICAL CONSTRUCTION
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has frequently looked to the
early and continuous practices of legislative, administrative,
and executive bodies and officials under a provision of the con-
stitution as an aid in its interpretation. Chief Justice Dixon's
statement in the 1872 case of Dean v. Borchsenius has been
91. Brown, supra note 84, at 655 n.*.
92. Id. at 692, 693.
93. Brown, The Making of the Wisconsin Constitution Part Two, 1952 Win. L. REv.
23, 62.
94. Wisconsin Cent. R.R. v. Taylor County, 52 Wis. 36, 62, 8 N.W. 833, 839 (1881).
95. B.F. Sturtevant Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 186 Wis. 10, 17, 202 N.W. 324, 326
(1925).




The uninterrupted practice of a government prevailing
through a long series of years, and the acquiescence of all its
departments, legislative, executive and judicial, sometimes
become imperative even on constitutional questions."7
This practical construction is a particularly useful aid in inter-
pretation when the governmental action is nearly contempora-
neous with the adoption of the constitutional provision at
issue.s
The application and rationale are well stated in Schultz v.
Milwaukee County.9 The issue was the validity of a statute
depriving county coroners (who are constitutional officers
under article VI, section 4) of jurisdiction to hold inquests.
Coroners had had such jurisdiction under the territorial stat-
utes, but exclusive jurisdiction to hold inquests was for a time
conferred upon justices of the peace by chapter 152, statutes of
1849, enacted by the first legislature under the constitution.
The court noted that "It]here were a number of members of
the constitutional convention in the legislature of 1849" and
concluded:
If vesting the right to hold inquests in a justice of the peace
instead of a coroner was an exercise of power denied to the
legislature by the constitution, the men who framed the con-
stitution who were then serving in the legislature, would cer-
tainly have protested.'
A 1949 decision, State ex rel. Frederick v. Zimmerman,'"'
presented the Wisconsin Supreme Court with a particularly
compelling case for the application of the doctrine of practical
construction. Unless the legislature's construction of the provi-
97. Id. at 246. See also Bashford v. Frear, 138 Wis. 536, 556, 120 N.W. 216, 223
(1909):
It requires a very clear case to justify changing the construction of a law, con-
ceded to be somewhat involved, which has been uninterruptedly acquiesced in,
for so long a period as fifty years.
98. Estate of Payne, 208 Wis. 142, 142, 242 N.W. 553, 553 (1932). See also Board
of Educ. v. Sinclair, 65 Wis. 2d 179, 184, 222 N.W.2d 143, 146 (1974); State v. Coubal,
248 Wis. 247, 256, 21 N.W.2d 381, 386 (1945); and Antieau, supra note 16, at 382: "The
value of this constructional aid grows weaker as years intervene between ratification
of the constitutional clause and the proferred practice .
99. 245 Wis. 111, 13 N.W.2d 580 (1944).
100. Id. at 119, 121, 13 N.W.2d at 583-84.
101. 254 Wis. 600, 37 N.W.2d 472 (1949).
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sion at issue was correct, no justice of the supreme court had
been legally elected to office since 1889.102
The supreme court has given great weight to "the view of
the constitutional allocations of power adopted by the political
branches of government" in issues relating to the relative pow-
ers of coordinate branches of government." 3 The rationale was
well stated by Chief Justice Rosenberry in 1943:
From the beginning those who have been charged with the
duty of exercising the various governmental powers have rec-
ognized that the constitution is primarily a set of principles
and not of rules; that in the application of these principles
there must be co-operation between the several departments
in adapting the constitutional principles to the practical af-
fairs of government in order to make the government worka-
ble.104
But in the final analysis, it is the judicial department that
must decide questions of constitutional construction, irrespec-
tive of the practice of the other departments of government.
Justice Marshall stated:
A constitution would be of little protection to the people
against their representatives who might for a time lose sight
of the wise limitations of the fundamental law, if the very
result of the infraction could be successfully held up to intim-
idate those who are charged with the duty of rectifying the
mischief. 1" 5
102. Id. at 611, 37 N.W.2d at 479. The issue was the validity of a 1949 statute
which, for the first time, required a primary election when there were more than two
nominees for the office of supreme court justice. An 1889 amendment to article VII,
section 4, provided for a supreme court of five justices "to be elected as now provided."
The relator argued that "now provided" incorporated the then-existing statutes relat-
ing to elections of justices and precluded the legislature from thereafter changing the
method of election. Id. at 607, 37 N.W.2d at 477. The court, in rejecting this conten-
tion, relied heavily upon the legislature's construction by its enactment of several
statutes commencing in 1889 which made changes in the manner in which justices were
elected. Every sitting justice had been elected under these statutes subsequent to 1889.
Id. at 608-11, 37 N.W.2d at 477-79.
103. State ex reL Reynolds v. Zimmerman, 22 Wis. 2d 544, 558, 126 N.W.2d 551,
559 (1964). See also Integration of Bar Case, 244 Wis. 8, 31, 11 N.W.2d 604, 615 (1943):
In matters of legislative procedure this court has attached great weight to long-
continued legislative practice as affecting the construction of a section of the
constitution.
104. Integration of Bar Case, 244 Wis. 8, 46, 11 N.W.2d 604, 621 (1943). But the
court refused to continue to acquiesce in the continued usurpation of judicial power.
See note 119 infra.
105. State ex rel. Owen v. Donald, 160 Wis. 21, 72, 151 N.W. 331, 347 (1915).
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Justice Timlin expressed a similar sentiment in 1910:
The advisory office of practical construction of a constitution
by other departments of government must, in the nature of
things, be limited to the very case theretofore passed upon.
Otherwise a single infraction of the constitution long ac-
quiesced in might break down the whole instrument.'16
The Wisconsin court has recognized that:
A power is frequently yielded to merely because it is claimed,
and it may be exercised for a long period in violation of the
constitutional prohibition without the mischief which the
constitution was designed to guard against appearing, or
without any one being sufficiently interested in the subject
to raise the question . . . . 07
In State ex rel. Weiss v. District Board of School District No.
Eight, "8 the school board presented evidence of the continuous
and uniform practice of the department of public instruction,
commencing in 1858, of recommending the Bible as a textbook
in public schools. The court said that its construction of the
constitution could not be controlled by the administrative
practice, stating:
The fact probably is that the practice of Bible reading in the
district schools was not seriously challenged at the outset,
and not subjected to close legal scrutiny until the policy of
the department had become fixed.' °'
Contemporaneous and practical construction by other de-
partments of government lose force where such construction
has not been uniform110 or where such construction has not been
acquiesced in by the judiciary."' Mere deference to the inter-
pretation of a provision by other departments of government
cannot save an unconstitutional enactment,"' for "[law-
106. In re Appointment of Revisor, 141 Wis. 592, 631, 124 N.W. 670, 684 (1910)
(Timlin, J., dissenting).
107. COoLEY, supra note 23, at 150; see also Estate of Payne, 208 Wis. 142, 146, 242
N.W. 553, 555 (1932).
108. 76 Wis. 177, 196, 44 N.W. 967, 974 (1890).
109. Id.
110. State ex rel. Allis v. Wiesner, 187 Wis. 384, 398, 204 N.W. 589, 595 (1925).
111. Lawrence Univ. v. Outagamie County, 150 Wis. 244, 251, 136 N.W. 619, 622
(1912).
112. Stierle v. Rohmeyer, 218 Wis. 149, 166-67, 260 N.W. 647, 654-55 (1935); Estate
of Payne, 208 Wis. 142, 146, 242 N.W. 553, 555 (1932); State ex reL. Attorney Gen. v.
Cunningham, 81 Wis. 440, 516, 51 N.W. 724, 740 (1892) (Pinney, J., concurring).
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breaking is none the less law-breaking because it is grayheaded
with age .... 113
The early Wisconsin cases in which the doctrine was devel-
oped must be read with care. These cases often purport to give
a stare decisis effect to the meaning adopted by the practices
of the legislative and executive departments in the construc-
tion of the constitution. Thus, the classic statement of the
doctrine in Dean v. Borchsenius, "I was preceded by the obser-
vation that:
Every city and village charter passed since the foundation of
the state, a period of nearly twenty-five years, during which
all of our cities and villages have grown up and been organ-
ized, and every act done under such charters in respect of the
improvement of streets, must inevitably fall and be adjudged
unconstitutional and void.115
It is well to remember that these cases were decided in an era
when a decision holding a law unconstitutional rendered the
law void ab initio and invalidated all actions taken in reliance
upon such law."' This harsh result has been ameliorated by the
subsequently-developed doctrine of prospective overruling."'
Construction of the constitution by other departments of
the government "can never abrogate the text. . .can never frit-
ter away its obvious sense. . .can never narrow down its true
limitations. . .can never enlarge its natural boundaries."'1
Practical construction demonstrates only the meaning ac-
corded to the constitution by the state officer or department
113. In re Appointment of Revisor, 141 Wis. 592, 602, 124 N.W. 670, 673 (1910).
114. 30 Wis. 236 (1872).
115. Id. at 246. See also State ex rel. Williams v. Samuelson, 131 Wis. 499, 513,
111 N.W. 712, 717 (1907)("The last phase of the case mentioned we deem of special
importance, since there are many important laws which might otherwise be fatally
affected.").
116. See, e.g., Kneeland v. City of Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 497, 505 (1862).
117. See Fairchild, Limitation of New Judge-Made Law to Prospective Effect
Only: 'Prospective Overruling' or 'Sunbursting', 51 MARQ. L. Rav. 254 (1967). See also
Holland v. State, 87 Wis. 2d 567, 599-600, 275 N.W.2d 162, 178 (Ct. App.), rev'd on
other grounds, 91 Wis. 2d 134, 280 N.W.2d 288 (1979). Cf. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S.
649, 665 (1944):
[W]hen convinced of former error, this Court has never felt constrained to
follow precedent. In constitutional questions, where correction depends upon
amendment and not upon legislative action this Court throughout its history has
freely exercised its power to reexamine the basis of its constitutional decisions.
118. STORY, supra note 2, at 310.
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engaging in the practice, which may or may not accord with the
intent of the people in adopting the constitutional provision., 19
IX. THE BROADER PURPOSES OF THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
The constitution of 1848 opened the Declaration of Rights
with:
All men are born equally free and independent, and have
certain inherent rights; among these are life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness; to secure these rights, governments are
instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed.2 0
and closed it with: "The blessings of a free government can
only be maintained by a firm adherence to justice, moderation,
temperance, frugality and virtue, and by frequent recurrence
to fundamental principles. ' '' 2' This is an express recognition
that individual rights are not created by the constitution, but
rather that the constitution was framed to prevent their loss or
diminution by the government about to be established. Cooley
stated:
In considering State constitutions we must not commit
the mistake of supposing that, because individual rights are
guarded and protected by them, they must also be considered
as owing their origin to them. These instruments measure the
powers of the rulers, but they do not measure the rights of the
governed.
2
In rejecting the contention that the franchise is a privilege not
a right, Justice Marshall stated for the court in 1910:
119. See State ex rel. Owen v. Donald, 160 Wis. 21, 70, 151 N.W. 331, 346 (1915).
While it shows the legislative intent, pretty conclusively, what meaning the
framers of the constitution intended to convey by the term "internal improve-
ments" might be more restrictive. We must recognize that it is the latter which
is the subject for discovery.
120. Art. I, § 1.
121. Art. I, § 22. Sections 23 and 24 of article I relating to transportation of school
children and use of school buildings were created in 1967 and 1972 respectively.
122. CooLEY, supra note 23, at 95. Wisconsin authority supporting Cooley comes
from Judge Winslow's observation in 1906 that "[Tihere are inherent rights existing
in the people prior to the making of any of our constitutions..." and his reference to
the words of art. I, § 1:
Notice the language "to secure these [inherent] rights governments are insti-
tuted;" not to manufacture new rights or to confer them on its citizens, but to
conserve and secure to its citizens the exercise of pre-existing rights.
Nunnemacher v. State, 129 Wis. 190, 200, 108 N.W. 627, 629 (1906).
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The difficulty seems to have been in failing to distinguish
between fundamental limitations which the people, in form-
ing a government, may place upon a right and the creation
of the right itself.'1
A year later, Marshall observed:
[T]he constitution is a very human document in the sense
that it is a collection of words recognizing, characterizing,
and guaranteeing the natural rights of man,. . . but it is not
so in the sense of creating such rights. The right to life, to
liberty, to happiness, to equality one with another, are not of
human creation. They are of Divine origin, though by human
instrumentality some one or more of them might be taken
away. It is to prevent that, in the main, the constitution was
framed."'
But these rights were not frozen as of 1848. That, in the
language of Justice Barnes, "would be tantamount to an ego-
tistical declaration that when the constitution was framed the
millenium had arrived and progress had reached its ultimate
goal.",u
The Wisconsin Constitution, unlike that of most states,
avoids a detailed specification of individual rights. Justice
Marshall wrote in 1913:
When it came to forming our state constitution, it was sup-
posed that the safety of human rights was sufficiently pro-
vided for by the general declaration [article I, section 1] and
the detail provisions associated therewith, emphasized by the
significant admonishment as to the importance of a
"frequent recurrence to fundamental principles." [article I,
section 22]. So no special guaranties were added, as has been
the case in most state constitutions. 2 6
In Chief Justice Rosenberry's language, the Wisconsin Consti-
123. State ex rel. McGrael v. Phelps, 144 Wis. 1, 12, 128 N.W. 1041, 1045 (1910).
124. Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 378, 133 N.W. 209, 226 (1911) (Marshall,
J., concurring).
125. State ex rel. Van Alstine v. Frear, 142 Wis. 320, 339, 125 N.W. 961, 968 (1910).
126. Ekern v. McGovern, 154 Wis. 157, 254, 142 N.W. 595, 624 (1913). In 1910,
Justice Marshall described art. I, § 1, as
the substructure upon which our whole constitutional system is bottomed. It
breathes the all-pervading purpose of the whole body of fundamental law.
Around and upon it are clustered all other things as subsidiary in a complete
structure.
State ex rel. McGrael v. Phelps, 144 Wis. 1, 14, 128 N.W. 1041, 1046 (1910).
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tution is "primarily a set of principles and not of rules. .. .
The fear was that a detailed specification of rights might
weaken the document. Speaking of the state constitution's pro-
hibition against sectarian instruction, Justice Lyons wrote in
1890:
Constitutions deal with general principles and policies, and
do not usually descend to a specification of particulars. Such
is the character of the provision in question. In general terms
it excludes sectarian instruction, and the exclusion includes
all forms of such instruction. Its force would or might have
been weakened had the attempt been made to specify therein
all the methods by which such instruction may be im-
parted.121
The constitution is not to be construed like a legislative
enactment. "A constitution which is to stand as the charter by
which to test, to guard, and to afford practicable individual
and collective enjoyment of, inherent rights, is not like a code
of ordinary law."'' 2 A statute "is necessarily subject to frequent
changes to meet new conditions, or broaden or narrow old ones,
which may be of a somewhat permanent or of quite a tempo-
rary nature," but a constitution is "a direct sovereign declara-
tion of principles evolved from long experience, conservative of,
or necessary to, efficient vitality of the basic idea of human
government and adaptable to conditions in praesenti and so far
into the future as human foresight can reach." '130
127. Integration of Bar Case, 244 Wis. 8, 46, 11 N.W.2d 604, 621 (1943). The
distinction is aptly made by the court in State ex rel. Owen v. Donald, 160 Wis. 21,
69, 151 N.W. 331, 346 (1915), in construing the art. VIII, § 10, prohibition against the
state's contracting debts for "works of internal improvement":
What are "works of internal improvement," in a constitutional sense, would
admit of differences of opinion as an original proposition. If it be confined to
the particular kind of improvements which moved the framers of the constitu-
tion to make the broad prohibition a part of the fundamental law, it means one
and a somewhat narrow thing. If it was a principle the constitution makers had
in view, and not particular activities within the scope of such principle, it means
quite another and covers a very broad field.
128. State ex rel. Weiss v. District Bd. of School Dist. No. 8, 76 Wis. 177, 199, 44
N.W. 967, 975 (1890). See also Justice Marshall's description of art. I, § 1: "That it
was intended to cover a broad field not practicable to circumscribe by any specific
limitation or limitations cannot well be doubted." State v. Redmon, 134 Wis. 89, 101,
114 N.W. 137, 138 (1907).
129. State ex rel. Postel v. Marcus, 160 Wis. 354, 360, 152 N.W. 419, 422 (1915).




In construing particular provisions of the state constitution,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court has frequently looked to sections
1 and 22 of article I, and to the preamble itself, to ascertain the
broader purpose of the constitution as a whole. The preamble
provides:
We, the people of Wisconsin, grateful to Almighty God for
our freedom, in order to secure its blessings, form a more
perfect government, insure domestic tranquility and promote
the general welfare, do establish this constitution.
Unlike the preamble to the Federal Constitution,'31 by this
preamble, "preservation of liberty is given precedence over the
establishment of government.' 32 The Wisconsin court has fre-
quently referred to the preamble as expressing the declared
purposes of the constitution as a whole.
33
In ascertaining the meaning of the constitution, the court
has looked to article I, section 1, to find the "constitutionally
declared purposes of government,' '34 and has regarded it as
"that comprehensive, basic guaranty making the constitution
as a whole a recognition and pledge for the preservation of the
rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."'' 31
131. We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union,
establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defence,
promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and
our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of
America.
132. State ex rel. Zillmer v. Kreutzberg, 114 Wis. 530, 532, 90 N.W. 1098, 1099
(1902). Referring to art. I, sec. 1, and the preamble, Justice Dodge stated:
It would be inconceivable that the people of Wisconsin, in establishing a govern-
ment to secure the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, should
by general grant of legislative power have intended to confer upon that govern-
ment authority to wholly subvert those primary rights ....
Id. at 532-33, 90 N.W. at 1099.
133. See State ex rel. Frederick v. Zimmerman, 254 Wis. 600, 614, 37 N.W.2d 473,
480 (1949); State ex rel. Atwood v. Johnson, 170 Wis. 251, 258, 176 N.W. 224, 226
(1919); Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 373, 133 N.W. 209, 224 (1911)(Marshall, J.,
concurring); State ex reL. Zillmer v. Kreutzberg, 114 Wis. 530, 532, 90 N.W. 1098, 1099
(1902); see also STORY, supra note 2, at 350-51.
134. State ex reL. Frederick v. Zimmerman, 254 Wis. 600, 614, 37 N.W.2d 473, 480
(1949); State ex rel. Zillmer v. Kreutzberg, 114 Wis. 530, 532, 90 N.W. 1098, 1099
(1902).
[Section 1] declares the purpose of the government about to be created. ...
At this late date it cannot be doubted that this declaration of the purpose to be
accomplished is to be construed as a limitation upon the powers given.
135. State ex rel. Milwaukee Medical College v. Chittenden, 127 Wis. 468, 506, 107
N.W. 500, 512 (1906).
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The supreme court has also recurred to the values of article
I, section 22, in construing the constitution.'36 Justice Marshall
stated in 1913, "There is no more important of such principles
than the one that private rights should be guarded, so far as
feasible, beyond even the possibility of arbitrary unjust inter-
ference . . . -,3, Justice Fowler said in 1935:
When things so monstrous as this are contemplated as within
the language of the statutory provisions under consideration
it behooves us to heed the admonitions of sec. 22, art. I, of
our state constitution . . . and to consider and determine
whether the thing attempted is contrary to those principles.'
When construing particular provisions of the state constitu-
tion, the court is to "tak[e] that broad view which gives the
constitution the effect intended . . . to secure the inherent
rights of men.' 39 To construe a provision of the constitution so
as to narrow its broad purposes "would be to destroy the spirit
and to cramp the letter." 4' To effectuate the purpose of the
instrument as a whole, the literal sense of the words "may be
viewed broadly or restrictively, or even violated. ... "I
In State ex rel. Rodd v. Verage,42 the supreme court, in
order to render effective the purpose of the constitution as a
whole, supplied the words "for cause" as a limitation upon the
provision empowering the governor to remove elected county
officers. Justice Owens stated for the court:
If the provision we are considering is to be construed as con-
ferring arbitrary power of removal upon the governor, then it
is apparent that the governor may remove county officers who
are distasteful to him from personal, political, or other rea-
sons and install officers of his own choosing to discharge the
official functions of these various county officers. That idea
136. See, e.g., State ex rel. Van Alstine v. Frear, 142 Wis. 320, 354, 125 N.W. 961,
973 (1910) (Marshall, J., concurring); State v. Redmon, 134 Wis. 89, 102, 114 N.W.
137, 139 (1907); State ex rel. Milwaukee Medical College v. Chittenden, 127 Wis. 468,
506, 107 N.W. 500, 512 (1906).
137. Ekern v. McGovern, 154 Wis. 157, 262, 142 N.W. 595, 627 (1913).
138. Stierle v. Rohmeyer, 218 Wis. 149, 167, 260 N.W. 647, 655 (1935).
139. State ex rel. Van Alstine v. Frear, 142 Wis. 320, 353, 125 N.W. 961, 973 (1910)
(Marshall, J., concurring).
140. STORY, supra note 2, at 323.
141. State ex rel. Williams v. Samuelson, 131 Wis. 499, 504, 111 N.W. 712, 713
(1907).
142. 177 Wis. 295, 187 N.W. 830 (1922).
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is not only obnoxious to an inherent sense of plain and funda-
mental justice, but it is out of harmony with the genius and
spirit of our institutions and would seem to neutralize a fun-
damental principle of popular government which was plainly
intended to be intrenched in the fundamental law of the
state.'
The state court has recognized that the language employed in
the provisions of the Declaration of Rights are to receive a
broad construction, 4 4 and are to be construed in light of our
present notions of human dignity. 4 1
Chief Justice Winslow's interpretation of the general
clauses of the Declaration of Rights, in the light of contempo-
rary conditions, is worth repeating at length:
A constitution is a very human document, and must embody
with greater or less fidelity the spirit of the time of its adop-
tion. It will be framed to meet the problems and difficulties
which face the men who make it, and it will generally crystal-
lize with more less [sic] fidelity the political, social, and
economic propositions which are considered irrefutable, if not
actually inspired, by the philosophers and legislators of the
time. But the difficulty is that, while the constitution is fixed
or very hard to change, the conditions and problems sur-
143. Id. at 299-300, 187 N.W. at 833.
144. Speaking of the inherent rights secured by art. I, § 1, Justice Dodge stated in
1902:
[T]hese words in the constitution are not to receive an unduly limited construc-
tion . . . for example, that "liberty" does not mean merely immunity from
imprisonment, and that "property" is not confined to tangible objects which can
be passed from hand to hand; that within the former word is included the
opportunity to do those things which are ordinarily done by free men, and the
right of each individual to regulate his own affairs, so far as consistent with
rights of others; and within the latter, those rights of possession, disposal, man-
agement, and of contracting with reference thereto, which render property use-
ful, valuable, and a source of happiness, right to pursuit of which is preserved.
State ex rel. Zillmer v. Kreutzberg, 114 Wis. 530, 533-34, 90 N.W. 1098, 1100 (1902).
Justice Winslow said in 1906:
It is true that the inherent rights here referred to are not defined but are in-
cluded under the very general terms of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happi-
ness." It is relatively easy to define "life and liberty," but it is apparent that
the term "pursuit of happiness" is a very comprehensive expression which cov-
ers a broad field.
Nunnemacher v. State, 129 Wis. 190, 200, 108 N.W. 627, 629 (1906).
145. State ex reL. Rodd v. Verage, 177 Wis. 295, 322, 187 N.W. 830, 841 (1922):
[O]ur fundamental notions of the rights of the individual, of the liberty of the
citizen, and of the repository of sovereign power do not conform to the spirit in
which the principles of the common law were generated and developed.
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rounding the people, as well as their ideals, are constantly
changing. The political or philosophical aphorism of one gen-
eration is doubted by the next, and entirely discarded by the
third; the race moves forward constantly, and no Canute can
stay its progress.
Constitutional commands and prohibitions, either dis-
tinctly laid down in express words or necessarily implied from
general words, must be obeyed, and implicitly obeyed, so long
as they remain unamended or unrepealed. Any other course
on the part of either legislator or judge constitutes violation
of his oath of office. But when there is no such express com-
mand or prohibition, but only general language, or a general
policy drawn from the four corners of the instrument, what
shall be said about this? By what standards is this general
language or general policy to be interpreted and applied to
present-day people and conditions?
When an eighteenth century constitution forms the
charter of liberty of a twentieth century government must its
general provisions be construed and interpreted by an eight-
eenth century mind in the light of eighteenth century condi-
tions and ideals? Clearly not. This were to command the race
to halt in its progress, to stretch the state upon a veritable
bed of Procrustes.
Where there is no express command or prohibition, but
only general language or policy to be considered, the condi-
tions prevailing at the time of its adoption must have their
due weight; but the changed social, economic, and govern-
mental conditions and ideals of the time, as well as the prob-
lems which the changes have produced, must also logically
enter into the consideration, and become influential factors
in the settlement of problems of construction and interpreta-
tion.'48
X. CONCLUSION-RECURRENCE TO AN INDEPENDENT
INTERPRETATION
The recent decisions of the Wisconsin Supreme Court indi-
cating that the Declaration of Rights may afford greater protec-
tion to the liberties of the people of Wisconsin than does the
Federal Bill of Rights, have focused largely on the holdings of
early Wisconsin cases.' 47 This is merely a start towards an ap-
preciation of the independent vitality of the state constitution.
146. Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 348-50, 133 N.W. 209, 215-16 (1911).
147. See cases cited at notes 1 and 12 supra.
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An examination of the reasoning of the early decisions may
prove most helpful.
These early decisions recognize that the primary and ex-
press purpose of the Wisconsin Constitution is to secure the
individual rights of its people. They heed the constitutional
admonition that "the blessings of a free government can only
be maintained . . . by frequent recurrence to fundamental
principles" ' and recur to the values and traditions of Wiscon-
sin.
Although willing to consider federal precedent which ac-
cords with the values of the Wisconsin Constitution,"' the early
court refused to be bound by contrary decisions. "We are fully
aware that the contrary proposition has been stated by the
great majority of the courts of this country, including the su-
preme court of the United States. The unanimity with which
it is stated is perhaps only equaled by the paucity of reasoning
by which it is supported. 1 50
Finally, they placed their sole reliance upon the Wisconsin
Constitution. Justice Smith's statement in 1855 is particularly
meaningful today:
The people then made this constitution, and adopted it as
their primary law. The people of other states made for them-
selves respectively, constitutions which are construed by
their own appropriate functionaries. Let them construe
theirs-let us construe, and stand by ours. 15'
148. Art. I, § 22.
149. See Allen v. State, 183 Wis. 323, 329, 197 N.W. 808, 810 (1924):
Under the constitution of our state every argument advanced by the United
States supreme court in favor of a broad and liberal construction of such provi-
sions is applicable and persuasive.
Justice Brennan recently wrote:
[S]tate court judges and also practitioners, do well to scrutinize constitutional
decisions by federal courts, for only if they are found to be logically persuasive
and well-reasoned, paying due regard to precedent and the policies under-lying
specific constitutional guaranties, may they properly claim persuasive weight as
guideposts when interpreting counterpart state guarantees.
Brennan, supra note 3, at 502.
150. Nunnemacher v. State, 129 Wis. 190, 198, 108 N.W. 627, 628 (1906).
151. Attorney Gen. ex rel. Bashford v. Barstow, 4 Wis. 567, [*758] (1856).
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